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The Company You Keep: Qualitative Uncertainty in
Providing a Club Good
Bipasa Datta and Clive D Frasery
February 13, 2017
Abstract
Clubs are typically experience goods. Potential members cannot ascertain pre-
cisely beforehand their quality (dependent endogenously on the clubs facility in-
vestment and number of users, itself dependent on its prices). Members with un-
satisfactory initial experiences discontinue visits. We show that a monopoly prot
maximiser never o¤ers a free trial period for such goods. For quality functions
homogeneous of degree of at least minus one, a welfare maximiser, motivated by
distributional concerns to mitigate disappointed consumers losses, always does. We
demonstrate the robustness of this nding by showing that: (i) without qualitative
uncertainty (thus, no disappointed customers), neither welfarist nor monopolist of-
fers free trials; (ii) If the planner pursues an objective mixing welfare maximisation
with prot maximisation, the likelihood of free trials increases with the weight put
on welfare maximisation. Regarding club quality and usage, the monopolist provides
a socially excessive level of quality to repeat buyers when the quality function is ho-
mogeneous of degree zero. With non-homogeneous quality functions, the monopolist
permits too little club usage; quality may or may not be socially excessive.
JEL Classication: D4, D6, D8, H, L12
Keywords: Clubs, Qualitative Uncertainty, Monopoly, Welfarist
1 Introduction
Club goods - shared congestible goods (e.g., transport, health, education and leisure fa-
cilities, telephone systems) - are important and pervasive. Their literature is extensive1,
but little theoretical research on their industrial organisation exists. Thus, theory does
not yet give much guidance on such classic policy-relevant issues as whether imperfect
competition leads to excessive investment in club quality, or excessive club prices relative
to the welfare optimum. This paper studies such important issues by comparing the pro-
vision and pricing rules of a monopolist and a welfare maximiser. We use a two-period
Department of Economics, University of York, YO10 5DD, UK; Ph: (44) (0)1904 323780; E-mail:
bipasa.datta@york.ac.uk
yCorresponding Author. Department of Economics, University of Leicester, LE1 7RH, UK; E-mail:
cdf2@le.ac.uk
1Cornes and Sandler (1996) and Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) survey key issues.
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model to show that a monopolist is likely to over-provide quality and allow too little
club use relative to a welfare optimum.
We emphasize particularly the qualitative uncertainty consumers face as club goods
are basically experience goods. Ex-ante, a potential club user is uncertain how agreeable
club membership will be. So, a parent evaluating a private school could have objective
information on sta¤-pupil ratios, its exam league table position and number of sport
teams it elds, yet not know if her child will thrive in its particular disciplinary ethos.
Again, in a private leisure club, the water in the swimming pool might be too tepid or too
enervating, the food more than she can stomach, or other club users just not her type.
Such customers must try the club good before really knowing what they buy and if they
wish to continue buying (stay members). The existing club literature largely ignores this
important aspect of qualitative uncertainty to deal with other important issues, such as
multi-jurisdictional many-club competition in large economies, congestion externalities
or tiered pricing (see, e.g., Wooders 1978, 1999; Cornes and Sandler 1996; Scotchmer
1985; Glazer et al. 1997).
A few club papers study qualitative uncertainty, but from the standpoint that poten-
tial members know their tastes for the club good and not the quality they will experience
as they cannot predict the club use of others (Sandler, Sterbenz and Tschirhart 1985;
Sterbenz and Sandler 1992) or if they will be allowed to join (Hillman and Swan 1979,
1983). In these papers, club membership and consumption are exogenous. Our model
has similarities with these analyses as our consumers ex-ante uncertainty about their
tastes makes aggregate club demand and quality random ex-ante. But there are major
di¤erences. First, in our model, club membership and usage are determined endogenously
via consumer self-selection, given the providers pricing and facility investment strategy.
Second, we explore both market and welfare-optimal club good provision. Third, our
analysis is dynamic: consumers who consume the club good in period 1 can stop doing so
in period 2 if they nd it not to their taste. Lastly, consumers are not rationed explicitly
if club demand is high. Rather, via the standard club mechanism, implicit rationing
is then via queuing (e.g., less teacher time per pupil or longer journey times), which
reduces the club goods quality.
As our club good is an experience good that generates the frequency of future use by
potential members, this paper relates to the literature on experience goods and repeat
buying. Crémer (1984), Liebeskind and Rumelt (1989), Hoerger (1993), Krähmer (2003),
Villas-Boas (2006) and Bergemann and Välimäki (2006), among others, analyse how
qualitative uncertainty associated with experience goods a¤ects buyers learning and
inter-temporal pricing by an imperfectly competitive rm. However, none compares
the behaviour of monopoly and welfare-maximising suppliers of the experience good, as
we do.2 This comparison lets us address classic concerns like: (i) Will the monopolist
overcharge for a congestion-prone good (e.g., cf. Mills 1981); (ii) Will the monopolist
2No-one analyses explicitly club goods with specic features like those noted above (although Crémer
(1984) mentions a club as an example of an experience good). Barbieri and Malueg (2014) provide a
recent example and survey of a related literature on how uncertainty impacts the private provision of a
pure public good.
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under or over-invest in quality (e.g., cf. Spence 1975)?
The most relevant papers for us, of those noted, are Crémer (1984) and Bergemann
and Välimäki (2006),3 which study monopoly specically. Crémer shows that a mo-
nopolist will not o¤er rst-time buyers of an experience good an introductory price but
charges repeat buyers a lower price . Bergemann and Välimäki show that a monopolist
supplying an experience good faces two types of markets: a mass market (where buyers
are willing to buy at the full information monopoly price) and a niche one (with unin-
formed buyers who are not) where pricing strategies di¤er. In the mass market, prices
decline over time; in the niche one, higher prices follow lower ones.
Inevitably, as argued in section 2.5.2 below, a distribution-sensitive welfarist treats
repeat customers relatively worse compared to rst-time customers than does a monop-
olist. This is because repeat customers have relatively favourable period-1 experiences
and are ex-post relatively better o¤ compared to period-1 consumers as a whole (some of
whose unsatisfactory period-1 experiences dissuade them from consuming the club good
in period 2). In our model, by assumption, any facility investment is made in period
1 and persists over both periods. So, a welfarists main instrument for redistribution
between consumers who try the club good and are disappointed and those who are not
is the price it charges in period 1 relative to that in period 2. In the limit, by charging
a zero period-1 price, it can shift the entire burden of paying for the club facility onto
only those with satisfactory period-1 experience with the club. Conversely, for any given
facility investment, the monopolist just wants to maximise revenues. By charging all
those who try the good initially, it can reduce period-2 price, perhaps inducing some of
those with bad trials that it would otherwise lose, to stay. Alternatively, at any given
period-2 price, it can increase investment to the same end. Our following results should
be seen in this light.
We show (Proposition 1) that a monopolist providing an experience club good will not
make a free "introductory o¤er" letting consumers "try for free before buying" (although
it could o¤er a low introductory price), but a welfare maximiser might. Specically, we
study the class of club quality functions homogeneous in the club facility investment
and usage. We show (Proposition 3, Corollary 1) that a welfarist always o¤ers a free
trial period for all degrees of homogeneity leading to feasible outcomes (necessitating
homogeneity of at least minus unity). This strong result highlights the welfarists redis-
tributive motive noted above.
Regarding the clubs provision of quality, we show the following: (i) under plausible
assumptions, if the degree of homogeneity exceeds minus unity, a monopolist always
invests in a greater level of facility provision per period-2 use of the club than does a
welfarist (Corollary 2); (ii) in the much-discussed case of a quality function homogeneous
of degree zero, this translates to a monopolist: (a) supplying a higher quality to repeat
3Liebeskind and Rumelt (1989), Hoerger (1993), Krähmer (2003) and Villas-Boas (2005) have di¤erent
angles to our paper. Liebeskind and Rumelt and Hoerger study quality uncertainty given adverse
selection on the producers side. Krähmer and Villas-Boas analyze how consumers learning with quality
uncertainty impacts on oligopolists pricing strategies. Others, e.g. Courty (2003) and Liu and Schiraldi
(2014), study monopoly intertemporal provision of a private experience good (a non-durable and durable
good, respectively) but do not let consumers repeat buy.
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buyers than does a welfare maximiser (Proposition 4); (b) supplying the level of quality
that a break-even welfarist would with fully-informed consumers.
Predictions about each suppliers behaviour reect a joint hypothesis about the sup-
pliers objective and its assumptions about the environment. A change in the assumed
environment usually alters the behaviour of a given supplier with an unchanged objec-
tive. Likewise, suppliers with di¤erent objectives will usually behave di¤erently in the
same assumed environment. Thus, inevitably, predicted di¤erences between the wel-
farists and monopolists behaviour will be due both to them having di¤erent objectives
and to them confronting qualitative uncertainty. So, to try to disentangle the e¤ect of
the di¤erence in the club suppliers objectives from that of qualitative uncertainty, we
also study a benchmark model with demand uncertainty but no qualitative uncertainty.
We expect a prot-maximising monopolist to do whatever is necessary and feasible in the
pursuit of prot in all environments. However, this pursuit will manifest itself di¤erently
in di¤erent environments. Similarly, we expect a utilitarian welfare maximisers behav-
iour to be inuenced by distributional concerns in all circumstances, again demonstrating
this in di¤erent ways in di¤erent environments. We show that both the monopolist and,
under reasonable assumptions, the welfarist will post positive prices in both periods of
this benchmark model. Nevertheless, although their behaviour is supercially similar,
the welfarist is still inuenced by distributional concerns while a monopolist is not at
all. This leads to greater predictability in the monopolists behaviour.
We further test the robustness of our conclusion that it is redistributive concerns that
lead to a welfarist pricing at zero in the introductory period when there is qualitative
uncertainty by considering when the club good supplier is neither pure welfare maximiser
nor pure prot maximiser. Suppose it seeks to maximise an arbitrarily weighted sum
of aggregate consumer welfare and producer surplus, subject to a no-loss constraint.
We show (Proposition 6): (i) if there is positive producer surplus at the optimum, if
consumer income is su¢ciently low in the trial period for the club good (in a sense made
precise below), then the optimal club price is zero in the trial period; (ii) if consumer
income is su¢ciently high in the trial period, then the optimal club price is positive
in that period. Moreover, the greater the weight a planner puts on consumer welfare
relative to producer surplus, the more likely is the club price to be zero in the trial
period.
Our theoretical results on quality are consistent with the rather sparse empirical
evidence, mainly for education and healthcare (e.g., Marlow 2000; Gaynor 2006). This
evidence suggests that, in a market for a shared good with endogenous price and quality,
quality can increase with the degree of monopoly (although this does not in itself say that
the monopoly level is excessive). But, for education at least, these empirical models are
often predicated not on prot maximisation but on bureaucratic budget maximisation.
So, the greater expenditure on providing the shared good found empirically in non-
competitive conditions need not be on quality-enhancing activities.
Section 2 presents our two-period model of qualitative uncertainty and analyzes rst-
time visitors period-2 club membership decisions. We determine membership endoge-
nously, depending on the providers price-quality strategy, and do comparative statics
4
on its sensitivity to price and quality. In section 2.2, we study the monopolists price
and investment choices and, in 2.3, a social welfare maximisers. We compare their equi-
librium pricing and investment in 2.4-2.5. In 2.6, we consider demand uncertainty but
not qualitative uncertainty (although much of the formal details are put in an Online
Appendix). In 2.7, we analyze some consequences of a planner seeking to maximise a
weighted average of consumer welfare and producer surplus. Section 3 presents our con-
clusions. An Appendix contains all proofs and derives a key equation that drive some
of our main ndings.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period model of club membership in an economy with one private
good and one club good ("a club" for short) with a sole supplier.4 Only the private good
is essential. There are n ex-ante identical consumers, n being very large. The assumption
of n being large is made to avoid having to analyze consumers internalizing their own
individual club usage decisions on aggregate usage in a Cournotian way. Consumers are
initially uncertain about the clubs quality. They must join and experience the club to
learn their evaluation of its quality, which then becomes their private information. To
nd his evaluation, a consumer must visit the club a xed number of times (normalised at
unity) in period 1, irrespective of the supplier. We assume all consumers learn their own
evaluation of the good perfectly and instantly after their period-1 visits, implying that
ex-ante homogenous consumers become heterogeneous in their valuations ex-post once
they join. Given his experience, a consumer then decides to remain a period-2 member
or to quit, and how many visits to make if he stays. Note, the issue of consumers rst
joining the club in period 2 does not arise. Given the period-1 price, as they are identical
ex-ante, either all join the club in period 1 to learn their evaluation or nobody joins.
Likewise, as consumers learn their evaluations of the club quality perfectly after the rst
visit, if they remain members this is because they prefer to do so given their valuations.5
Assume that a typical consumer has a strictly concave time-separable utility func-
tion with per period utility U(xi; vi; c("; y; Vi)); where: xi is his period is private good
consumption, i = 1; 2; vi is his total club visits in period i; y is the quantity of the
club good (equivalently, its facility size) that, once provided, does not depreciate; Vi is
the total visits by all members in period i; " is a random-valued parameter capturing
the qualitative uncertainty and c("; y; V ) is the quality or congestion function, with
c("; y; Vi) increasing in ". For simplicity, we take the function U(:) to be quasi-linear:
U(xi; vi; c("; y; Vi))  u(xi) + "viC(y; Vi)
4Fraser (1996) has a similar set-up on excludable public goods. Lind (2016) considers the issue
of the optimal and equilibrium number of organizations to supply a di¤erentiated public good to a
heterogeneous population. However, he does not consider any aspect of uncertainty.
5Similarly, there is no basis for the supplier to randomly ration customers in period 1 and then allow
their entry in period 2. Note that our assumption of perfect learning after the intitial visit is quite usual
in the literature on experience goods (see e.g. Jing (2011)). Incorporating gradual learning in our model
will be interesting and is part of our future research plans (see our concluding comments).
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with u(xi) being strictly concave.
An example claries the three inuences on c. In a health club with a pool, everyone
prefers a 50m pool to a 25m one, though it costs more (a larger y). This is like vertical
di¤erentiation. But, depending on their realised ", some swimmers might nd a given
pool temperature too high, some too low and others just right. This is like horizontal
di¤erentiation. Lastly, all agree that, from their viewpoint, fewer swimmers (a smaller
V ) are better than more - again like vertical di¤erentiation.
Assumption A1 species the distribution of " (A3, introduced in section 2.1, gives
more details of its support); A2 says that club quality increases in the facility size but
decreases in crowding:
A1 The parameter " is distributed over the interval [" , "] with density function f(")
and CDF F ("): The supplier knows f and F , but not any individuals realisation
of ".
A2 Cy(y; V ) > 0;CV (y; V ) < 0;C(0; V ) > 0:
The club good is supplied by a prot-maximizing monopolist acting as a Stackelberg
leader to choose provision level y and prices pi for periods i = 1, 2 at the start of period
1. We assume linear pricing6 and a constant unit cost of unity to provide the club good.
Let V denote the aggregate number of visits made in period 1: V = n = V1: Letting
Mi, i = 1; 2, be the period i income of consumers, the budget constraints of a member
in periods 1 and 2 are then, respectively:
M1   p1 = x1; M2   p2v2 = x2
For most of our analysis, it is unnecessary to specify the relationship betweenM1 andM2.
However, we take the rst period as the trial period in which consumers can instantly
learn their valuations, ", after a single usage of the club good. So, it might be plausible
to take period 2 to be of longer duration with M2 > M1 and to let consumers period-2
purchases of the club good not only reect any higher income that they might have
during that period but also to vary according to the favourableness of their evaluation,
". As shown in section 2.6, it turns out that allowing consumers to optimise over their
period-2 purchases of the club good, rather than restricting them to consume only either
one or zero units of it in period 2, has important implications for distribution and, hence,
for a welfare-maximisers pricing of the club good.
Unless we state otherwise, the sequence of events is:
 Period 1. The leader sets y, p1 and p2. People then decide to join (or not) the
club and make a visit. After experiencing it, they become heterogeneously (and
6As period-1 visits are xed, a consumer e¤ectively has to pay a lump sum (a membership fee) to
join the club and try the club good. So, pricing has the avour of intertemporal two-part pricing.
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privately) informed about its quality, based on which they decide whether to stay
in the club or to exit.7
 Period 2. If a customer remains with the club, he decides how many visits to make
in period 2, given his private valuation of it.
As each consumers realisation of " is private information, a provider has no more
information on period 2s demand at the start of period 2 than at the start of period 1.
So, it cannot gain from setting p2 at the start of period 2 rather than period 1.
2.1 The members problem in period 2
2.1.1 The exit decision and club membership
For convenience, denote v2 by v and V2 by V from now on until we consider a bench-
mark case without qualitative uncertainty. Suppose each member treats V (determined
endogenously later) as parametric and chooses v to maximise period 2 utility subject
to the budget constraint.8 For a given p2 and y, we assume that both a supplier and
consumers can infer the V that will occur in an equilibrium. Additionally, given the
large number of consumers, V is taken to equal its expected value (or decision makers
take it as so when making their decisions), i.e., there is no aggregate uncertainty.
A typical member then solves the following period 2 problem:
max
v
u(M2   p2v) + "vC(y; V )
Letting u0 be the rst derivative of utility function u, the rst-order condition (FOC)
yields:
 p2u
0(M2   p2v) + "C(y; V ) 5 0 for v = 0 (1)
with  p2u0(M2) + "C(y; V ) 5 0 if v = 0: Now, with quality taken as parametric,
 p2u
0(M2) + "C(y; V ) is increasing in ": The following assumption ensures that f (")
has su¢ciently wide support.
A3 " < 0; so " < p2u0(M2)=C(y; V ); " is su¢ciently large so that " > p2u0(M2)=C(y; V )
holds for all possible values of p2 and C:
The signicance of " < 0 is that, given A2, there are realisations of " that leave
consumers su¢ciently disappointed to be unwilling to consume the club good at any
7We do not (explicitly) treat exit or congestion fees, for, as we see later, neither the monopolist nor
the welfarist provider wants to discourage consumers from trying out the good at the start of the game.
However, the model can support the interpretation of there being an implicit exit fee.
8Formally, this requires n to represent a continuum. But, as Acemoglou and Jensen (2010, note 5)
observe, even if the game is not large with innitessimal players, we can still look for an equilibrium in
which each player takes the aggregate, V , as given. None of our ensuing results change if we treat the
continuum case explicitly, but the mathematical notation is much complicated.
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non-negative price. Then, given assumptions A2 and A3, for a given M2, y and V , there
exists an " 2 ["; ") such that
 p2u
0(M2) + "C(y; V ) R 0 according as " R ":
Call " 2 ["; ") the marginal quality valuation - i.e., " solves
 p2u
0(M2) + "
C(y; V ) = 0: (2)
So, " just leaves the consumer indi¤erent between choosing some club consumption and
not. Clearly, " is a function of p2 and y (as well as other parameter values, such as
M2). Note that the number of visits at the marginal quality valuation is zero: v(") = 0:
Lemma 1 shows how period-2 club membership is determined depending upon the
realization of ":
LEMMA 1 (Single Crossing) Members with " = " stay in the club, those with " < "
exit.
A member who stays in the club has visits v = v ("; p2; y; V ) solving
 p2u
0(M2   p2v ("; p2; y; V )) + "C(y; V ) = 0 (3)
Thus, ex-ante (when seen from period 1), for a given p2 and y, the expected number of
visits by a member is given by
Z "
"
v("; p2; y; V )dF ("): (4)
Denoting v("; p2; y; V ) by only v(") from now on, unless otherwise necessary, the expected





Lemma 2 shows the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in expected visits for
a given p2 and y.
LEMMA 2 For a given y and p2, a unique equilibrium in expected period 2 visits exists.
2.1.2 Some comparative statics
The following comparative statics for consumers responses to magnitudes that they take
as parametric are used to solve the leaders problem:
LEMMA 3 (i) @V=@y > 0; (ii) @V=@p2 < 0; (iii) @"=@y < 0; (iv) @v (") =@" > 0;

















Thus: (i) aggregate (and individual) visits increase with the level of facility provision;
(ii) an increase in p2 reduces aggregate (and individual) visits; (iii) more people stay
with the club if the level of provision increases; (iv) period 2 demand for the club good
increases with the favourableness of period 1s experience; (v) the e¤ect of p2 on club
membership depends on the responsiveness of individuals to quality. This last result is
of independent interest. We show below that p2 can be set at a level where a further
increase would produce either a rise or no change in club membership, depending on the
club providers objective.
2.2 The Monopolists problem
The monopolist acts as a Stackelberg leader, choosing (y; p1; p2) to maximise its prot
knowing that members behave as described above, where pi 2 [0;1); i = 1; 2 and1 >>
y = 0:9 So we assume, like several other papers on dynamic monopoly pricing with
demand uncertainty, that it can commit deterministically to its pricing and quality
strategies in advance.10 Price commitment is a commonly used strategy (e.g., limited-
time o¤ers) and is often implied by the repeated nature of transactions where the
seller/provider is trying to build up a reputation for quality and prices. We conne
attention to a pure strategy equilibrium.11
The monopolist maximises subject to the constraint that agents join the club in the
rst period. One may argue that a monopolist might wish to deny club access in period
1 to some of the ex-ante identical consumers so as to raise the clubs period-1 quality
for any given level of y, and thereby earn a higher p1 and/or p2: However, it cannot do
so in our setting. This is because of the standard assumption in entrepreneurial club
models that the supplier posts prices and allows all consumers who wish to purchase the
club good at those prices to do so. Then, with ex-ante identical consumers, if one wishes
to join the club in period 1, all will wish to do so. Without this assumption, we would
have to consider an explicit rationing mechanism for the monopolist. The possibility
of being rationed then would have to be incorporated in consumers maximisation and
participation constraints also.12
9One can think that there is a choke-o¤ price p such that demand is zero above that price. Likewise,
if investment y is set arbitrarily large, the provider needs to set price arbitraily large as well - which
would then make its payo¤ go to zero.
10See, e.g., Courty (2003), Lewis and Sappington (1994), Van Cayseele (1991), Jing (2011) and Liu
and Schiraldi (2014).
11Full commitment then implies we can rule out "ratcheting e¤ects" à la La¤ont-Tirole - which nor-
mally produce mixed strategy equilibria in non-commitment games.
12However, this requires introducing capacity limits along with ex-ante buyer heterogeneity - neither
of which is a feature of our model. For this purpose, one can refer to the literature on advance pur-
chase discounts with demand uncertainty where rationing is important (e.g. Dana (1998), M
::
oller and
Watanabe (2010), Nocke, Peitz, and Rosar (2010). This literature analyses how such discounts price
discriminate between buyers of di¤erent valuations where the price discriminationg strategies depend
upon the rationing rules.
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subject to the participation constraint (PC):
u(M1   p1) + C(y; V )E(") + 
Z "
"
[u(M2   p2v(")) + "v(")C(y; V )] dF (") =




" "f(")d" and ; 1   > 0 is the discount factor. We assume that
the monopolist can earn strictly positive prots and satisfy PC. Using subscript i;
i = 1; 2, to denote the corresponding period and superscript m to denote magnitudes
for the monopolist, let Lm be the Lagrangian, m the multiplier, um01 = u
0(M1  p1) and
um02 = u
0(M2   p2v(")) in the monopoly case,
Lm = nfp1 + 
Z "
"
p2v(")dF (")g   y + 









After simplication, the FOCs for this maximisation problem are:13
@Lm
@pm1
= n  mum01 5 0 for p
m




































dF (") 5 um01 for y
m = 0:
We conclude the following from these FOCs. First, from equation (7), m = n=um01 >
0. Hence, the participation constraint binds. So, as expected, consumers get no rent in
13The monopolists strategy space is closed and bounded and its objective and constraint functions
are continuous, so equilibria exist characterised by these FOCs. It is also easily seen that these FOCs
identify an equilibrium in pure strategies. Consumers cannot deviate and improve welfare by not joining
the club: their utility outside the club is their reservation expected utility from membership. Given
consumers do not deviate, the monopolist maximises prot while satisfying these FOCs.
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equilibrium, whether pm1 > 0 or not. Second, p
m
2 > 0 holds; otherwise, the demand for
period-2 club visits would be innite and this maximisation would have no solution. But
can pm1 be zero? I.e., could the monopolist make a "free introductory o¤er" (interpreted
as a "free trial period") on the club good? Proposition 1 shows the answer is no. This
is because the monopolist wants to extract surplus from period-1 users to make repeat
buying more attractive in period 2.
PROPOSITION 1 The monopolist does not make a free introductory o¤er on the club
good - i.e., pm1 > 0:
Note, although the monopolist does not make a free introductory o¤er, it can still
make an introductory o¤er - i.e., have pm1  p
m
2 : a result that di¤ers from Crémer (1984),
where the monopolist never made an introductory o¤er to rst-time buyers. If it charges
pm1  p
m
2 then it does so perhaps to induce some of those customers with relatively bad
trial experience not to exit, or (as if) to reward the consumers who stay with the club,
or both.14 If, on the other hand, it charges pm1 < p
m
2 , it does so to extract more surplus
from those (ex-post) high-valuation buyers.
Remark 1 (Remarks on pm1 > 0)
15Note that pm1 > 0 also holds when individuals are
not treated as innitessimally small, but as discrete. Consider the analogous model with
discrete individuals and taste parameters drawn from a discrete distribution, say  (").
As the Appendix shows, all that we use to prove Proposition 1 is that the participation
constraint holds with equality, so there is full rent extraction, at the monopoly optimum.
This will be true if v, p1 and p2 are continuous variables. Given these, it is easy to for-
mulate the participation constraint with discrete individuals and to show that Proposition
1 holds in this environment. This participation constraint is
u(M1   p1) + C(y; V )E(") + 
P




where now V =
P
"=" v(") ("). Retracing the steps of the proof of Proposition 1 in
the Appendix when this binds shows that pm1 > 0 holds with discrete individuals too.
Additionally, it is worth stressing that pm1 > 0 prevails even without any consideration of
capacity constraints and/or ex-ante demand heterogeneity. For example, with a binding
capacity constraint and (say) the e¢cient rationing rule, if ex-ante identical consumers
are to be rationed (at random), the monopolist may have an incentive to raise pm1 and
adjust pm2 accordingly in order to satisfy the intertemporal participation constraint that
makes pm1 > 0. On the other hand, if consumers are heterogeneous ex-ante, then with a
binding capacity constraint and the e¢cient rationing rule, consumers with the highest
willingness to purchase will be served, leaving the less eager consumers being rationed -
which again implies pm1 > 0: This then gives rise to intra- as well as inter-temporal price
14 It is as if the leavers then pay an (implicit) exit fee as they can no longer benet from the lowered
period-2 price.
15We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting inclusion of this discussion.
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discrimination. What is interesting about our result is that, in contrast to the literature
on monopoly pricing with demand uncertainty (see footnote 12), pm1 > 0 prevails even
without any capacity limit and/or any ex-ante demand heterogeneity.
Now, pm2 > 0 implies (8) holds as an equality. Substituting 
m = n=um01 , using (25)





















um02 v(")dF (")] < 0, the monopolists period-2 pricing rule
implies:
OBSERVATION 1 The monopolist sets pm2 > 0 such that jvj = 1:
jvj = 1 is a marginal revenue = 0 condition analogous to ones found elsewhere -
e.g., in the e¢ciency wage hypothesis. Having chosen y and p1, the monopolist picks a
p2 that maximises V C, the quality-adjusted aggregate expected visits. This maximises
consumers willingness to pay for the club good in period 2. So, when the monopolist
chooses the pm2 that leads consumers to maximise their willingness to pay for the club
good at a given y and pm1 , it also maximises its expected revenues whilst extracting all of
the expected surplus from consumers. Lemma 3(v) shows that @"=@p2 = 0 if jvj = 1:
Thus, the p2 the monopolist chooses also has the feature that a marginal variation in that
price would have no impact on the number of people buying the club good. However, it
would alter the amounts bought by infra-marginal members.
Lastly, we cannot rule out at this stage the possibility that ym can be zero.
2.3 A benchmark: social welfare maximisation (under an identical in-
formational constraint)
As a benchmark, consider provision of the club good by a benevolent social welfare
maximiser. Like the monopolist, she knows members behaviour, as described in sections
2.1.1 and 2.1.2, but cannot observe agents ex-post valuation of the good. (So, she cannot
engage in discriminatory pricing ex-post.) She uses this information while solving the
following social welfare maximisation problem:
max
p1;p2;y












p2v(")dF (")] > y (11)
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where (11) requires that the expected revenue from the club good must cover its provision
cost.16 We assume that the social welfare can be strictly positive while satisfying the
above expected revenue constraint. The optimal values of the choice variables ", p2,
etc., here will thus generally di¤er from the corresponding values for the monopolist.
Let subscript i; i = 1; 2; denote the time-period (as in the monopoly case) and
the superscript s denote magnitudes in the welfarists regime (except with C where,
to save clutter, we omit the superscript s). With Ls the Lagrangian for the welfarists




=  us01 + 
















gdF (")] 5 0 for ps2 = 0
@Ls
@ys













dF (")  s 5 0 for ys = 0
By the same argument as with monopoly, ps2 > 0 in equilibrium. So, (13) holds with















(14) indicates s > 0 - i.e., the revenue constraint binds.18 This, with ps2 > 0, implies
16We can reasonably ignore the participation constraint (6) for, if it binds with a prot- maximizer
making positive prots, it will certainly be slack with a welfarist that just breaks even and leaves some
surplus with consumers.
17As with monopoly (footnote 13), the welfarists strategy space is compact and its objective and
constraint functions are continuous. So, equilibria exist satisfying these FOCs. Consumers get positive
expected surplus in the welfarist equilibrium. They cannot deviate to improve welfare by not joining the
club, which would yield their reservation expected utility. As consumers do not deviate, the welfarist
cannot do better than satisfy these FOCs.







gdF (")] < 0. This cannot be, given C2y+C2V @V@ys > 0
and Cy > 0. So, s > 0 must hold.
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ys > 0 at the welfarists optimum. Hence, (14) holds with strict equality. Thus, members
receive some rents at the welfarists optimum (as opposed to none under monopoly).
However, even with s > 0; (12) can have a corner solution, which we show formally in
Proposition 3, Corollary 1, with homogeneous C (:). Hence, we have
OBSERVATION 2 The welfarist could make a free introductory o¤er on the club good
(i.e., have ps1 = 0):
Observation 2 helps us to prove the following in the Appendix:
PROPOSITION 2 If the welfarist makes a free introductory o¤er, then she also sets
ps2 > 0 so that j v j> 1 holds. Also, there is then overprovision of the good in
the Samuelson rule sense that willingness to pay for the marginal investment in
the club facility is less than its cost.
Recall that the Samuelson rule is a condition for the optimal provision of a shared
good (see e.g. Cornes and Sandler 1996). It states that optimal provision occurs where
the total willingness to pay for an incremental unit of the good (its "marginal benet")
just equals the marginal cost of getting that unit. Conventionally, it is said that there is
"overprovision" of the good if its supply is taken to a point where its marginal benet
is less than its marginal cost. There is "underprovision" if the converse holds. However
(as seen below), a case indentied as "overprovision" by this rule, with marginal benet
less than marginal cost, can also be one of zero provision.










gdF (")] = 0 (16)







gdF (") < 0. I.e., other things equal, the welfarist could increase
its expected revenue by lowering p2. The rationale is simple: as jvj > 1, quality is
very sensitive to visits at the optimum and it will wish to discourage visits, other things
equal. It can do so by raising ps2 to above the prot-maximizing level, given its choice
of ys and ps1. The fact that a welfarist chooses to operate where consumers expected
willingness to pay for the good is not maximised, given y, reects the second-best nature
of its problem. As club use is xed in period 1, the only role of ps1 is to nance facility
investment, y. If ps1 is set to zero, this nancing of y will come exclusively from p
s
2: If so,
then it is as if the welfarist is redistributing from those with high-realised valuation, who
consume the club good in period 2, to those who do not (i.e., those with low-realised
valuation).
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2.4 Monopoly versus welfarist equilibrium
At the monopoly equilibrium pm1 > 0 and p
m
2 > 0, although y
m = 0 is possible; at the
social optimum ps2 > 0 and y
s > 0, while ps1 =0 is possible. Note that all the choice
variables cannot simultaneously be strictly positive for both the monopolist and the
welfarist.19 So, there are only three possible ways in which the monopolists equilibrium
can di¤er from the social optimum:
1. Regime (a). pm1 > 0; p
m
2 > 0; y
m > 0; ps1 = 0; p
s
2 > 0; y
s > 0;
2. Regime (b). pm1 > 0; p
m
2 > 0; y
m = 0; ps1 = 0; p
s
2 > 0; y
s > 0; and
3. Regime (c). pm1 > 0; p
m
2 > 0; y
m = 0; ps1 > 0; p
s
2 > 0; y
s > 0:
2.5 The characterisation of di¤erent regimes
We now explore which one(s) of the above regimes is (are) likely to occur and their im-
plications. Given ambiguities of the existing literature on monopoly provision of quality
of a private good with both price and quality endogenous (e.g. Spence 1975; Sheshinsky
1976), we especially wish to identify when we can rank the monopoly provision of quality
for the club good relative to that in the welfare optimum.
2.5.1 A homogeneous quality function
We rst study cases when the quality function, C(y; V ), is homogeneous. Formally, a
function C(y; V ) is homogeneous of degree k (abbreviated "h.o.d.k." here) if it satises
the following equation:
C(ty; tV ) = tkC(y; V ) for all t > 0 (17)
Although C (y; V ) might not be homogeneous, homogeneity is a convenient simplica-
tion for visualising the consequences of di¤erent extents of qualitative returns to scale.
In the club context, an h.o.d.0 quality function is often discussed (as are homogeneous
technologies more generally in the theory of production).20 When C(:) is h.o.d.0, chang-
ing y and V in the same proportion keeps both facility provision per use of the club
and the clubs perceived quality constant. If k =  1, doubling y and V keeps facility
provision per use of the club constant but halves the quality as perceived by customers.
Our general result is the following:
PROPOSITION 3 Suppose that the quality function C(y; V ) is homogeneous of degree
k. Then: (i) regime (c) cannot occur for any k; (ii) regime (b) occurs if and only
19 If all variables were positive simultaneously for both the monopolist and welfarist, we can show that
their FOCs become exactly identical. In this model, that will only be possible when both prots and
welfare are zero at the optimum. (This follows for, in this model, the monopolists and the welfarists
problems can be considered as dual to one another.) But we have already ruled out this uninteresting
case by assuming that the monopolist and welfarist make strictly positive payo¤s.
20See Barro and Romer (1987), Fraser (2000; 2012) and Kolm (1974), among others, on implications
of homogeneous club quality or congestion functions.
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if k =  1; (iii) only regime (a) occurs for all k satisfying k + 1 > 0:21
Proposition 3 shows that: (i) the only degrees of homogeneity of C(:) that lead to
a feasible solution satisfy k + 1  0; (ii) with su¢ciently large qualitative scale disec-
onomies, the monopolist nds it suboptimal to invest in the club facility. For example, if
k =  1, as crowding per se causes customers such detriment, it would then nd it more
protable to not spend on the facility and keep visits low if it wishes to uphold quality.
But, an even more striking and important implication of Proposition 3 is the following
Corollary:
COROLLARY 1 A welfarist always o¤ers a free trial period (i.e., sets ps1 = 0) for all
degrees of homogeneity of C (:) that lead to a feasible solution.
Corollary 1 shows that, with a homogeneous C (:), a welfarists behaviour contrasts
starkly with a monopolists, which never o¤ers a free trial (Proposition 1).
If consumers were risk-neutral and bought at most one unit of a zero-production-cost
private experience good each period, a monopolist would extract all of consumer surplus
by charging in period 1 only. Conversely, a welfarist would price at zero each period.
But, if the experience good is congestible and period-2 congestion is reducible by using
p2 to choke o¤ some demand, other things unchanged, both a monopolist and a welfarist
have an incentive to set p2 > 0: If, additionally, the supplier can increase the goods
quality by investing in the facility, then the welfarist might have an incentive to have
p1 > 0 to raise funds for that purpose.
In the much-discussed case with C (:) h.o.d.0, as noted above, C(y; V ) = c(y=V ) and
c0 (y=V ) > 0; for some function c (:). Quality then just depends on the facility investment
per use of the club. For example, patients at a health clinic might nd the quality of
care depends on the average time doctors spend with each patient and average drug and
equipment spending per treatment, or a parent might think that the quality of school
lessons is determined by just the sta¤-pupil ratio. The club good is then like a purely
private good producible under constant returns. Consumers do not care whether it is
produced in one or any number of facilities if the same ratio of facility investment to
usage is maintained in each. Unsurprisingly, then, despite varying period-2 use of the
club by members, the welfarist still chooses p1 = 0 and nances the private-like club good
of unvarying quality via p2 > 0. What is remarkable, however, is that this behaviour by
the welfarist extends to other degrees of homogeneity, when the club good is not purely
private-like.
In the context of Proposition 2, Proposition 3 also means that a welfarist over-supplies
the club facility in the Samuelson rule sense for all feasible degrees of homogeneity k (i.e.,
homogeneity of degree greater than or equal to minus 1). Conversely, in regime (a), as
ym > 0, (2.9) means that the monopolists provision satises Samuelsons rule. If k =  1,
regime (b) holds. Then, (2.9) indicates that, generically, the monopoly overprovides
21 It can be checked that, for k <  1, there is no monopoly equilibrium, so a comparison between the
monopoly equilibrium and welfarists optimum is irrelevant.
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under this rule, although ym = 0. This seems paradoxical. But, it just implies that
any provision by the monopolist would be socially excessive, given the conguration of
its other choice variables, because the marginal cost of provision exceeds the marginal
benet, even at a zero level of facility provision. This comparison is also signicant for
exemplifying the well-known fact that Samuelsons rule need not have a straightforward
implication in terms of levels of provision of a shared good.22
When C (:) is h.o.d.0, the fundamental elasticity condition jvj = 1 () V
mCmV +
Cm = 0 at the monopoly equilibrium has a simple intuitive interpretation. Dening the
facility investment per period-2 club visit by z  y=V , the condition becomes c (zm)  
zmc0 (zm) = 0: that for maximizing c (z) =z with respect to z. The maximizing zm is
unique if c00 < 0. Granted this, the monopolist makes the investment in the quality of
a visit that maximises the return per unit investment in quality. Fraser (2000, 2005)
shows that this unique z solving c (z)   zc0 (z) = 0 is what a welfarist, constrained to
break even supplying fully-informed consumers in a single-period setting, would choose
with the same quality function. So, in the h.o.d.0 case with qualitative uncertainty,
a monopolist supplies the full information welfare-maximising club quality to period-2
consumers but the welfare maximiser does not. The monopolists behaviour mimics that
in Bergemann and Välimäkis mass market, but in a club context.
In the arbitrary k-degree homogeneous case, the quality function satises C (y,V )
= V kc (y=V ) for some function c (:). We can show that the monopolist then always
wishes to o¤er a higher level of facility provision per visit than does the welfarist if the
facility provision elasticity of quality, zc0 (z) =c (z), z  y=V , is monotonic in the facility
provision per visit, z. First, we show in the next Lemma that zc0 (z) =c (z) is decreasing
in z at both the monopolists and welfarists equilibrium. Hence, if it is monotonic, it
must be decreasing everywhere.
LEMMA 4 If there are diminishing returns to an investment in the facility provi-
sion (i.e., c00 < 0) and the facility provision elasticity of quality, zc0 (z) =c (z),
is monotonic in z, then it is decreasing everywhere.
The following corollary, showing that the monopolist will always invest in a greater
level of facility per period-2 visit than the welfarist, follows from Lemma 4 and the fact
that their equilibria satisfy zsc0(zs)=c(zs) > k + 1 = zmc0(zm)=c(zm):
COROLLARY 2 If the conditions of Lemma 4 are satised, zm > zs.
In the h.o.d.0. case, the following proposition follows immediately from Lemma 4
and Corollary 2.
PROPOSITION 4 If C (:) is h.o.d.0 . and the elasticity of quality w.r.t. facility
provision is monotonic, then C (ym; V m) = c (ym=V m) > c (ys=V s) = C (ys; V s):
the monopolist invests in socially excessive quality provision for period 2.
22 In a di¤erent setting (specically, with no qualitative uncertainty and with technological external
scale economies or diseconomies in providing club goods), Kennedy (1990) shows that a club facility is
under-provided in a competitive market. Conversely, a monopolists provision is e¢cient as it internalises
the cost externality.
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This result occurs because the monopolist both wishes to extract rent from those who
try in period 1 but not buy in period 2 (hence it sets pm1 > 0) and to provide an incentive
for those period-1 tryers to remain period-2 buyers. It can do this by ensuring a high
period-2 quality, which relaxes the participation constraint. The welfarist, conversely,
is concerned about equity as well as e¢ciency. It is interested in equalizing the actual
utility of stayers and leavers as nearly as possible. So, it prefers to not charge in period
1, though this means relatively less funds are available for facility provision to enhance
period-2 quality.
By pricing in this way, the welfarist operates a limited system of random redistribu-
tive taxation: only consumers with good enough period-1 experiences are taxed to pay
for the club good. Their "tax" increases with the favourableness of their experience as
their club use increases in ". Indeed, were transfers possible, the welfarist might wish to
make ex-post equalising transfers to those who choose to not use the club in period 2 due
to bad period-1 experiences. It is limited for, by assumption, transfers are impossible.
So, setting ps1 = 0 is the best it can do.
Surprisingly, this scenario is reminiscent of the literature on monopoly pricing with
asymmetric information where high prices signal high product quality (e.g. Milgrom
and Roberts 1986; Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Judd and Riordan 1994)). In such mod-
els, to signal quality, a monopolist may charge a price well above the full-information
prot-maximizing one. Our no-signalling model can have an observationally equivalent
implication: when the club goods quality is yet unknown, a monopolist credibly pro-
vides a higher quality club good than a welfarist would by charging a higher period-1
price than the latter (i.e., pm1 > p
s
1 = 0). Simultaneously, this contrasts sharply with
Lewis and Sappington (1994). In the latter, to signal quality, the monopolist can cost-
lessly and strategically provide information about the product via, e.g., free samples or
car test drives that are like our welfarists free introductory o¤er. This monopolists
incentive in Lewis and Sappington is due to her wanting to maximise prots through
price discrimination and so improved private information by buyers allows her to seg-
ment the market according to buyers valuation. Such a tendency to extract rents from
buyers through explicit price discrimination does not arise in our model as all consumers
are homogenous ex-ante. Nevertheless, our model can have the avour of intertemporal
price discrimination if the monopolist charges a higher second-period than rst-period
price - i.e., if pm2 > p
m
1 (> 0):
An Example Suppose C (y; V ) = [(y=V ) + ]#, for some scalars  < 0 and # 2 (0; 1).
Then, it is easy to show that ym=V m = # 1 > y
s=V s.23 So C (ym; V m) =
[(ym=V m) + ]# > C (ys; V s) = [(ys=V s) + ]#.
23From (2.10),   (ym=V m) [ + (ym=V m)]# 1 # + [ + (ym=V m)]# = 0 ()   (ym=V m)# +
[ + (ym=V m)] = 0 () (ym=V m) (1  #) +  = 0 () ym=V m = 
# 1
. Likewise, from Proposition




2.5.2 A nonhomogeneous quality function
From Proposition 3, we know that homogeneity of C (:) severely restricts the possibility of
regimes (b) and (c) occurring. So, we will now suppose that C (y; V ) is not homogeneous
and that these regimes are possible. What might be the characteristics of these regimes?
We will make the following reasonable assumption:
A4 CV V 5 0 (increasing marginal disutility of congestion); CV y = 0 (increased facility
provision ameliorates the negative impact of increased club usage).24
In comparing monopoly and welfarist regimes now, the visit elasticity of quality plays
the same pivotal role as in the homogeneous case (cf. the proofs of Propositions 3-4 and
Lemma 4). In regime (b), the inequality jsvj > j
m
v j = 1 holds as j
m
v j = 1 by Observation
1 and jsvj > 1 by Proposition 2. Conversely, under regime (c), j
s
vj = 1 (combining




v j = 1 holds.
We can use this, together with the properties of v when C is non-homogeneous, to show
that monopoly will plausibly result in less than socially optimal period-2 use of the club
in regimes (b) and (c).
To see how the elasticity v  V CV (y; V ) =C (y; V ) behaves in response to changes




CCV + CV CV V   V (CV )
2






CCV + CV CV V   V (CV )
2

< 0 and (CV CV y   V CV Cy) > 0.
Thus, other things equal, an increase in V will decrease v (make it more negative),
while increasing y will increase it. In both these regimes ym = 0: So, to compare the
monopolist and the welfarists behavior in them, we let dy = ys > 0 = ym. Then, to
satisfy V mCV (0; V m) =C (0; V m) =  1  V sCV (ys; V s) =C (ys; V s) and (2.18), we must
have V s > V m. This establishes the following:
PROPOSITION 5 Under regimes (b) and (c) and A4, the aggregate second period
visits to the club under monopoly are less than the socially optimal level: V m < V s:
CV y = 0 in A.4 can be violated and yet we get V s > V m in regimes (b) and (c). E.g.,
if C (y; V ) = h (y) =g (V ) for some positive increasing functions h and g, then CV y =
 h0 (y) g0 (V ) =g (V )2 < 0. Yet, direct calculation shows that CV CV y   V CV Cy = 0 in
this case and, so, we must have V s > V m as before.
Under Proposition 5s conditions, as period-1 aggregate club visits under both monopoly
and the social optimum are equal, aggregate expected visits over the two periods are
greater at the welfare optimum than under monopoly. But we cannot compare period-2
quality levels in regimes (b) and (c) for, although ys > 0 = ym, V s > V m might still
mean C (0; V m) > C (ys; V s) holds. Still, as total period-1 visits (V ) are the same under
24Note, if C (0; V ) > 0 did not hold, regimes (b)-(c) could not occur: the monopolist would not get
any period-2 customers and the participation constraint could not be met if ym = 0.
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holds - implying that the welfarist o¤ers a
higher period-1 quality than the monopolist in these regimes. This is consistent with the
suggestion that, compared with the welfarist, the monopolist is more focused on treating
retained customers well, even if at the expense of disappointed period-1 customers. Such
arguments imply that the monopolist could o¤er a higher quality to repeat customers,
yet a lower quality to rst-time and once-only customers, than does the welfarist. So,
unlike in a single-period model, we cannot say unambiguously that the monopolist will
over- or under-supply quality.
2.6 Behaviour with demand uncertainty, but not qualitative uncer-
tainty.25
To assess how sensitive our results are to the experience nature of the club good, we
now examine a model with a similar set-up to that studied so far, except that there is
no qualitative uncertainty. Instead, we assume that there is demand uncertainty: each
consumer now knows their " from the start of period 1 whilst the supplier only knows
the distribution of ", again denoted F (") :
2.6.1 Binary decisions in both periods
First, we study when consumers can consume only 1 or 0 unit of the club good in each
period.
For any given y and p1 chosen by the supplier and aggregate use of the club good in
period 1, now denoted V1; consumers, who now know their ", will buy the club good if
and only if
u (M1   p1) + "C (y; V1) = u (M1)() " = [u (M1)  u (M1   p1)] =C (y; V1)
A marginal consumer valuation for this period-1 problem, now denoted "1, is dened
by
"1 = [u (M1)  u (M1   p1)] =C (y; V1)  u1=C (y; V1)
So, "1 = 0 if p1 = 0. Also, V1 must satisfy V1 = n
Z "
"1
dF (") : Thus, substitution









We now use this to obtain the comparative statics of "1 with respect to p1 and y.
Again letting the period 1 congestion function C (y; V1)  C1; let C1V and C1y denote
25We are indebted to the anonymous referee whose comments motivated us to include subsections 2.6
and 2.7 in this paper.
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Consumers learn nothing in going from period 1 to period 2. If they are restricted to
purchasing either 1 or 0 units of the club good in period 2, they have the same problem
in period 2 as in period 1. So, we can dene period-2 magnitudes p2; u2, "2, C2 and























dF (") + p2n
Z "
"2
dF (")  y =
p1n [F (")  F ("





where "1 and "

2 are, respectively, functions of p1 and y; and p2 and y. To avoid
too many notational changes and clutter, let superscript "m" now also denote the op-
timal values (just as in the qualitative uncertainty monopoly case).The FOCs for this
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1=@p1 5 0 (2.23 (i))

















2=@y   1 5 0 (2.23 (iii))
It is clear immediately that pm1 and p
m
2 must be positive, or else we have contradictions
of (2.23)(i)-(ii). It is also clear why the monopolist will not price at zero in either period:
it has nothing to gain from doing so and would simply forego revenues. Also, we see that
these two FOCs are actually identical. This means that, if M1 =M2, then pm1 = p
m
2 > 0
will solve (2.23)(i)-(ii) holding with equality. The only thing that links the two periods
for the monopolist is the non-depreciating club facility investment, ym, for which it
equates the discounted marginal revenues to marginal cost if ym > 0 ((2.23)(iii)).
If the club good supplier is instead a welfarist seeking to maximise the total utility of
those who buy and do not buy the club good over the two periods, subject to breaking
21
even, then its formal optimisation problem is
Max
p1;p2;y
nu (M1   p1) [F (")  F ("
s






nu (M1) [F ("
s






"dF (") + nu (M2) [F ("
s
2 )  F (")]
s.t. p1n [F (")  F ("s1 )] + p2n [F (")  F ("
s
2 )] = y (2.24)
We can proceed as before to formulate the corresponding Lagrangian and derive
the FOCs (see the Online Appendix). These optimising conditions show that, again,
if M1 = M2, then ps1 = p
s
2 will hold. Hence, if y
s > 0, the welfarist will levy the
same positive price in the two periods to nance it. Of course, as the monopolists and
welfarists FOCs di¤er, so will the prices pmi and p
s
i ; i = 1; 2; that solve them.
However, the most important observation is that, with the supplier facing demand
uncertainty in the absence of qualitative uncertainty, there is no di¤erence between the
pricing behaviour of the two types of suppliers in this special case. Although they
will generally charge di¤ferent prices from each other, neither discriminates between
the consumers in the two periods. This is a striking di¤erence from the behaviour we
highlight with qualitative uncertainty, when consumers di¤er between the two periods
as they go from not knowing their " to being fully informed about it.
2.6.2 Consumers can optimise over second period visits
For direct comparability with our earlier model of qualitative uncertainty, we next sup-
pose consumers can purchase 1 unit of the club good in period 1, but can optimise over
their period-2 club visits constrained only by their budget constraints. The structure of
demand in period 2 is the same for a supplier as in the model with qualitative uncer-
tainty: consumers also know their period-2 tastes in that model. When the supplier is
a monopolist, it now maximises discounted expected prots over two periods given by





v (") dF (")  y (2.25)
Letbon variables denote optima with variable period-2 visits. It is again easy to show
(see the Online Appendix) that bpm1 > 0 and bpm2 > 0 hold. Likewise, it is again evident
that only the non-depreciating bym links the two periods.
If the sole club supplier is a welfarist under the same assumptions, then it prices to
maximise two-period expected welfare subject to breaking even. I.e., it maximises
nu (M1   p1) [F (")  F ("
s





v (") dF (") + nu (M1) [F ("
s
1 )  F (")]+
nu (M2   p2) [F (")  F ("
s





v (") dF (") + nu (M2) [F ("
s
2 )  F (")]
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subject to
p1n [F (")  F ("
s
1 )] + p2n
Z "
"s2
v (") dF (") = y (2.26)
Although we cannot rule out bps1 = 0 in all circumstances at the optimal choices, we can
nd su¢cient conditions to do so. The Online Appendix shows that a su¢ciently large re-







1 - su¢ces to ensure bps1 > 0 at the optimum.
The contrast between the unambigous implications for monopoly pricing, irrespective
of whether or not consumers are restricted to a binary choice in period 2, and the
ambiguity in the welfarists pricing when consumers can optimise over second period
club usage highlights two things. The rst is that di¤erences between the two suppliers
behaviour is because of the redistributive concerns of the welfarist. The second is that
these concerns can be obscured in a model that restricts consumers to purchase only
either one or zero units of the club good in each period. The following argument explains
why this is so.
Denitionally, a utilitarian welfarist is concerned about distribution in all circum-
stances. This is as true when there is no qualitative uncertainty as when there is. In
our model without qualitative uncertainty, if we restrict consumers choice of club visits
to a binary choice, we then have the lowest possible level of inequality if transfers are
not allowed. There is still some inequality, for those who have a low known " are worse
o¤ than those who have a high " and choose to buy the club good at positive prices.
However, at this minimum attainable level of inequality, if it is optimal for the welfarist
to invest in the club facility, then it would choose a positive price in both periods (and
certainly if M1 = M2, when it chooses p1 = p2) as there is no distributional basis for
di¤erentiating between consumers as a whole in the two periods.
If we have no qualitative uncertainty but allow consumers to optimise over visits,
this introduces more inequality: those with a larger " are better o¤ for that reason, but
also because of the ability to increase their purchases of the desirable club good. This
causes the welfarist to engage in more redistribution as compared with the situation
when consumers only have a binary choice over the purchase of the club good. It is not
able to redistribute to those with low " by reducing p2  this would just encourage those
with high " to buy even more of the desirable club good in period 2 and thereby increase
inequality. So, the only way for the welfarist to engage in more redistribution/favour
those with low " relative to those with high " is for it to reduce p1 (and/or increase
p2). In principle, it might wish to reduce p1 all the way to zero even with no qualitative
uncertainty if we allow consumption of the club good to di¤er between consumers in a
non-binary way.
2.7 Behaviour when the welfarist has a di¤erent objective
So far, we have adopted the standard approach to welfare maximisation in a productive
economy exposited in texts such as Cornes and Sandler (1996) - namely, maximise the
social welfare function subject to an economy-wide resource or transformation function.
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Here, with productive activities involving simply the transformation of xed endowments
into the private consumption good or the club facility one-for-one, the transformation
function can be taken as the break-even constraint. However, it is possible that a planner
would put some weight on producer as well as consumer interests. This might be so,
for example, if consumers and the producer are distinct and consumers do not own the
producer. To allow for this possibility, we revert to a model with qualitative uncertainty
to consider the outcome if the planner seeks to maximise a weighted sum of consumer
welfare and producer surplus, subject to a no-loss constraint in production. We show
that distributional concerns again dictate the planners behaviour.
For arbitrary   (0; 1], let the weighted sum of consumer welfare and producer
surplus that the planner maximises (with endogenous marginal valuation "2) be
fn [u (M1   p1)] + C(y; n)E (") + 
Z "
"2


















p2v (") dF (")  y
#
= 0 (2.27)
Let superscript sw now show optimal values. From the relevant Lagrangian, optimal
values satisfy the no-loss constraint and the following FOCs:
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Evidently, these FOCs are identical to those for the original welfarist problem, except
the Lagrange multiplier in the latter, s, is replaced by (1  + sw) =.
Our principal result in this scenario, stated as Proposition 6 below, shows, essen-
tially, that psw1 = 0 is more likely the larger the weight the planner puts on consumer
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welfare relative to producer surplus. This reiterates our observation that distributional
considerations determine the welfarists pricing behaviour.
PROPOSITION 6 (i) Let M  (u0)
 1 [(1  ) =], where (u0) 1is the inverse func-
tion for u0: Then psw1 > 0 if M1 > M:(ii) If the producer gets positive surplus,
then psw1 = 0 if M1 5M.
Propositon 6 all makes sense in terms of redistribution. If the rst-period income,
M1, is su¢ciently large, the planner is not impelled to charge psw1 = 0 to partially
compensate those who have such unfavourable experiences in period 1 that they do not
wish to purchase the club good in period 2. Rather, it will either take advantage of
the returns to scale in providing a shared good and charge even those customers in
order to increase y; or/and it will reduce psw2 . Further, as M is increasing in , the
greater the weight put on consumer welfare relative to producer surplus, the less likely
is M1 > M and psw1 > 0 for sure. It follows that we are more likely to have a corner
solution psw1 = 0 the greater is the weight put on consumer welfare relative to that put
on producer surplus. This reinforces our previous conclusion that we get ps1 = 0 for
distributional reasons - in particular, because the welfarist seeks to compensate as best
it can those with an adverse initial experience with the club good.
For a given  and (1  ), the cut-o¤ income level M is xed. So, other things
equal, with this weighted maximand, if there is positive producer surplus, psw1 = 0 will
hold if rst-period income is su¢ciently low.
3 CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The literature has not studied the experience good aspect of clubs. We show that it
can lead to very contrasting investment and pricing strategies for a monopoly prot
maximiser and a welfare maximiser.
In our model, potential members visit the club a xed number of times in period 1 to
learn perfectly their evaluation of its quality. Based on this, they decide if to continue as
members and their number of visits, or to exit for good. So, pricing strategies announced
in period 1 and the investment in the shared facilities are crucial in determining the clubs
ultimate membership and social welfare.
In this scenario, whether a club provider o¤ers an introductory discount to con-
sumers with no prior knowledge of its quality depends on its type. A welfare maximiser
might give consumers an "introductory free trial period". It does so denitely if the
quality function is homogeneous. This reduces the welfare disparity between those who
try the product, nd it unsatisfactory and exit the club, and those who like it and
stay. Conversely, a monopolist focused on extracting as much rent as possible from con-
sumers never makes a free introductory o¤er. So, all its customers, stayers and leavers,
contribute to any cost of facility provision and to prots.
Our results are consistent with Spence (1975), Sheshinsky (1976) and others that
show a monopoly might over-provide quality. They are also consistent with results
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in models of monopoly pricing with experience goods and repeat purchases where the
monopolist does not o¤er introductory prices to rst time buyers (e.g., Crémer (1984)
and Bergemann and Välimäki (2006)). But such papers do not study explicitly, as we do,
the implications of peculiar features of clubs - the congestion externality and endogenous
determination of quality arising both from members utilization choice and the providers
pricing and facility provision strategy.
We model the club good as an experience good subject to negative network exter-
nalities. A large literature after Katz and Shapiro (1985) studies positive and nega-
tive network externalities. We know of no papers analyzing their qualitative uncer-
tainty/experience aspects. Maybe Lambertini and Orsini (2001) is closest to our focus.
They do not study the experience aspects of network goods but do show that a monop-
olist is likely to over-supply quality with a positive externality network good.
Archetypal clubs like leisure facilities are not the only ones with experience charac-
teristics. For example, a schools ethos and teachers dedication a¤ect its quality. Also,
di¤erent parents might take contrasting stances on the balance between concentration
on the "3 Rs" and, say, pastoral care. In the same vein, many welfare states try to
ensure equal opportunity to ex-ante identically-treated individuals by providing a xed
amount of primary and secondary education free at the point of delivery. Only those
with a preference or aptitude for education have to pay for extra in the tertiary sys-
tem. The predictions of our welfarist analysis with ex-ante identical consumers mimic
this scenario. This rationalises observing partial tax nancing of such goods and partial
nancing by user charges, a rationalisation starkly di¤erent from that based on ex-ante
di¤erences between consumers.
In our two-period model, ex-ante uncertain consumers learn their valuations of the
club good perfectly after the rst purchase. Our model can be extended into a multi-
period framework where consumers may need to experience the good a few times to learn
their true valuations, the timing of learning di¤ering due to their heterogeneity. The
provider will then face a mixture of consumers, some maybe knowing their own types
whilst others do not. It then may want not to commit to any pricing strategies ex-ante.
Analysing the potential dynamics between price commitment, level of facility provision
and behaviour-based pricing strategies is then a meaningful direction for future research.
A further natural question to ask is whether our results extend to other environments,
such as the multi-jurisdictional competition one of the Tiebout hypothesis.26 We know
of no theoretical analysis of Tiebout under uncertainty, much less one with qualitative
uncertainty when a club good is the local service subject to jurisdictional competition.
We believe that our results are likely to be robust to such a setting.
A crucial component of Tiebouts hypothesis is consumers free mobility between
di¤erent jurisdictions. Given this mobility, if there is a wide range of jurisdictions avail-
able, individuals reveal their true preferences for the public good by choosing to reside
in the one where provision most closely matches their preferences. Then, all those living
in the same jurisdiction essentially have the same preferences. However, this outcome is
26We are indebted to the Associate Editor who suggested that we discuss implications of the Tiebout
hypothesis for our analysis.
26
based on the Tiebout idea that consumers exactly know their valuation for the public
good (or the public good that they will be consuming).
In our model, the club good is an experience good. This violates the Tiebout as-
sumption of full information. If any club good provided by any competing monopoly is
an experience good, consumers cannot necessarily pick the right club for them ex-ante,
even with perfect residential mobility. This is because consumers will have to try before
they know what they buy for any club. (See below for a description of equilibrium.) So,
as long as there are no other costs involved - e.g., transportation costs - we conjecture
that knowing this, local monopolists will still choose the same pricing strategy as we
have analysed in this paper.
To illustrate this, suppose that a very large population of ex-ante homogenous con-
sumers inhabit a two-period world, as in this paper. Suppose, moreover, there are
a number of possible jurisdictions and consumers are initially assigned to jurisdictions
randomly  i.e., each consumer is a random drawing from the same taste distribution and
each has an equal chance of being assigned to any jurisdiction. Then, by the multivariate
law of large numbers, the initial populations and taste compositions of the jurisdictions
will be equal almost surely. Suppose there is one club supplier in each jurisdiction and all
the local monopolists operate clubs with exactly the same quality functions and commit
to exactly the same prices (p1 and p2) that satisfy the consumers participation con-
straint in order to maximise their expected prots. All consumers will be prepared to
join the club in their jurisdiction (as there is no incentive to move elsewhere on grounds
of price or/and quality). Moreover, depending on their actual realisation of ", each con-
sumer will remain with the club or quit in period 2 in exactly the same way that we
have analysed so far. If it quits a given club, it will have no incentive to join another
jurisdictions, given that will have the same characteristics as the one it has left. This is
therefore an equilibrium. An immediately striking feature of such an equilibrium is that,
unlike with Tiebout, it will be characterised by taste heterogeneity within jurisdictions
that are just copies of each other.
Now suppose, instead, consumers are still ex-ante homogenous but some jurisdictions
have unique resources that impact on consumers perception of the quality of the club
good they supply. Then, even if putative members are allocated to jurisdictions randomly
as just described, the ex-post situation will be one of taste heterogeneity allied to product
di¤erentiation amongst monopolists. Given that each of the goods provided by the
local monopolies are still experience goods, we expect that the monopolists will adopt
similar pricing rules to those studied in this paper. However, the actual monopoly club
prices themselves will di¤er from one jurisdiction to another. Moreover, because of the
di¤erences in prices and qualities, the analysis of equilibrium will necessarily be more
involved than that in this paper.
In sum, we believe that the experience good aspect of the club good in our model
makes our results robust to Tiebout-type generalisations, provided di¤erent jurisdic-
tions do not have unique characteristics that impact upon consumers perceptions of
quality. Conversely, if we did not have the experience good aspect and the qualities were
completely known at the start of the game, then that would give rise to Bertrand-type
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competition amongst local monopolies with zero mobility costs. This would be expected
to bring price(s) down to zero (or the actual cost of provision).
4 APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. The marginal quality valuation, ", satises p2u0(M2)+"C(y; V ) =
0 ((2.2) in the text). Given p2 and C;  p2u0(M2)+"C(y; V ) is increasing in " and equals
zero at " = ": Hence, for " > ",  p2u0(M2 p2v)+"C(y; V ) = 0 can be satised for some
v > 0: But this implies that members having " = " remain in the club and make positive
visits (the marginal member "remains" in the club but makes zero visit). Obviously, for
" < ", members make zero visits and exit the club as  p2u0(M2) + "C(y; V ) < 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2. For a given p2; y and V , the club usage choice of someone
with experience " is a continuous and di¤erentiable mapping v("; p2; y; V ) : [0;M2=p2]!
[0;M2=p2] satisfying (3):The ex-ante expected visits for this consumer satisfy (4) and
those for all consumers must satisfy V = n
R "
" v("; p2; y; V )dF (") uniquely if a unique
equilibrium exists. Dene the aggregate expected visit mapping V (p2; y; V ) by V (p2; y; V ) =
n
R "
" v("; p2; y; V )dF (") : [0; nM2=p2] ! [0; nM2=p2]. This mapping is also continuous
and di¤erentiable. By di¤erentiating,
n@
hR "
" v("; p2; y; V )dF (")
i





dF (") < 0, us-
ing (3) and Leibnitzs rule. So, V (p2; y; V ) is monotonically decreasing in V and takes
its maximum value at V (p2; y; 0), where nM2=p2 > V (p2; y; 0) > 0, with the rst inequal-
ity following from the fact that the private good is essential. As nM2=p2 > V (p2; y; 0) >
V (p2; y; nM2=p2), the graph of V (p2; y; V ) against V must cross the 450 line uniquely
from above at a point where V (p2; y; V ) = V . Thus, a unique equilibrium in expected
visits exists for a given p2 and y. 




























































So, as the level of provision increases, both individual and aggregate visits increase.
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(iv) By (2.3) in the text, p22u
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Proof of Proposition 1. As the participation constraint binds in equilibrium




[u(M2   p2v(")) + "v(")C(y; V )  u(M2)] dF (")
= u(M1)  u(M1   p1)  C(y; V )E(")
If pm1 = 0, then the RHS will be strictly negative while the LHS will be strictly positive,
given that for " > " the person get more utility in the club than out. This would violate
the participation constraint. Hence pm1 > 0. 
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2 v (") dF (")
#
[1 + v] = 0
which is (2.10) in the text.




not, so ps1 = 0 yet u
s0
1 = 
s. Suppose the welfarist were then to increase ps1 to p
s
1 = " > 0,
for some very small ". To rst-order, the loss of welfare in rst period utility is exactly
counter-balanced by the value of extra funds, s. Thus the welfarist could equally well
set ps1 = " > 0, contradicting the unique optimality of p
s
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< 0; hence [v + 1] < 0 ()j v j> 1 as
C2V < 0:
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(ii) Using the fact that us
0
1 > 
s for ps1 = 0, equation (14) - which holds with equality



















dF (") < us
0
1
The left hand side is the (expected) marginal valuation of increased facility provision.
The rst n [:] term is the expected benet from increased facility size (taking into account
any direct and indirect impact on quality, the latter from any induced change in conges-







@ys dF ("), is
the valuation of the expenditure on extra visits induced by the increased facility provi-
sion. The right hand side is the utility value of the cost incurred to increase the facility
size. There is overprovision of the club good in the Samuelson rule sense since the valua-
tion of the good induced by an increase in facility size falls short of the cost of providing
that increase in the facility. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Our strategy for this proof is to show, rst, that if
C (y; V ) is homogeneous, then the monopolists behaviour under regimes (b)-(c) (i.e.,
ym = 0) occurs i¤ C (y; V ) is homogeneous of degree  1 (abbreviated "h.o.d. 1"). We
then show that C (y; V ) being h.o.d. 1 is inconsistent with the welfarists behaviour
under regime (c). So, if C (y; V ) is h.o.d. 1, then only regime (b) holds. For all other
k, only regime (a) is possible. But, the monopolists behaviour under regime (a) is only
consistent with C (y; V ) being h.o.d.k , where k + 1 > 0.
Suppose that C(y; V ) is h.o.d.k., i.e.
C(ty; tV ) = tkC(y; V ) for all t > 0 (28)
Then, by Eulers theorem,
yCy + V Cv = kC(y; V ) (29)
At the monopoly equilibrium (omitting time subscript "2" on magnitudes): jmv j =
1) V mCmv =  C(y
m; V m): Substituting in (29) then yields:
ymCmy = (k + 1)C(y
m; V m) (30)
Proof of part (i): regime (c) cannot occur for any k.
In regime (c), pm1 > 0; p
m
2 > 0; y
m = 0; ps1 > 0; p
s
2 > 0; y
s > 0:With ym = 0
for the monopolist and C(0; V ) > 0 (see (A2)), (30) then implies the only possible





v + 1] = 0 ) V
sCsv =  C
s for the welfarist, which then yields, similar to the
monopoly case, the following form of (29): ysCsy = (k+ 1)C(y
s; V s)) ys = 0 if k =  1
thereby contradicting the fact that ys > 0 in this regime.
Proof of part (ii): regime (b) occurs if and only if k =  1:
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In regime (b), pm1 > 0; p
m
2 > 0; y
m = 0; ps1 = 0; p
s
2 > 0; y
s > 0:The )part:
If k =  1, then (30) implies ymCmy = 0: As Cy(0; V ) > 0 by (A2), we must have
ym = 0:This means, from the monopolists point of view, both regimes (b) and (c) are
possible. However, as just shown above, with k =  1; for the welfarist, regime (c) is not
possible. Therefore, the only candidate for a plausible regime, when k =  1 is regime
(b). We need to verify that ys > 0 is consistent with regime (b). We do that as follows.





Csv + 1] < 0) V
sCsv + C
s < 0 (31)
Now, from (29), ysCsy + V
sCsv = kC(y




s; V s) = (k + 1)C(ys; V s) (32)
i:e:, V sCsv + C(y
s; V s) = (k + 1)C(ys; V s)  ysCsy (33)
Then, using (4.12),
(k + 1)C(ys; V s)  ysCsy < 0 (34)
i:e:, (k + 1)C(ys; V s) < ysCsy (35)
When k =  1; (4.16) )
ysCsy > 0) y
s > 0 as Csy > 0 (36)
Thus, if C is h.o.d. 1, then only regime (b) holds.
Proof of part (iii): Only regime (a) can occur for all k satisfying k + 1 > 0:
We know from parts (i)-(ii) that we can rule out regimes (b) and (c) i¤ k + 1 6= 0.
So, if k + 1 6= 0, only regime (a) can occur and we must have ps1 = 0; y
m > 0, and
ys > 0. Now, for the monopolist, ymCmy = (k+1)C
m (equation (30)) implies ym > 0 ,
k + 1 > 0, by (A2). 
Proof of Lemma 4 By denition, if C (:) is homogeneous of arbitrary degree
k, then C (y; V ) = V kc (y=V ) for some function c (:). As V mCmV + C
m = 0 at the
monopoly equilibrium and CV = kV k 1c (y=V )   yV k 2c0 (y=V ) then, using zm 
ym=V m; zmc0(zm)=c(zm) = k + 1. Likewise, as V sCsV + C
s < 0 at the welfarist equilib-
rium, we can show zsc0(zs)=c(zs) > k + 1. Now, by di¤erentiation,
d [zC 0 (z) =C (z)] =dz = [C 0 (z)] 2 [zC (z)C 00 (z) + C 0 (z) fC (z)  zC 0 (z)g].
As C (zm) zmC 0 (zm) = 0, then d [zmC 0 (zm) =C (zm)] =dz < 0 must hold. Likewise,
C (zs)  zC 0 (zs) < 0; so d [zsC 0 (zs) =C (zs)] =dz < 0 also. Therefore, if zC 0 (z) =C (z) is
monotonic, it must be decreasing everywhere. 
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) The FOC for psw1 is  u





Thus, psw1 > 0 must hold if  u
0 (M1) +
(1 )
 > 0. This is because 
sw > 0 cannot
reverse the last inequality, as is required by Kuhn-Tucker. It can only be reversed by
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psw1 > 0 ensuring  u




 = 0. Now,  u
0 (M1)+
(1 )
 > 0 ()
(1 )
 >
u0 (M1) () M1 > (u
0) 1 [(1  ) =]  M, by concavity, where (u0)
 1 is the inverse
function of u0: So, M1 > M guarantees psw1 > 0, irrespective of whether or not there
is positive producer surplus at the optimum. (ii) If the producer earns positive surplus,
then the no-loss constraint does not bind and the multiplier on the no-loss constraint is
sw = 0. From (2.28)(i), the FOC for psw1 becomes









Now, a corner solution psw1 for implies u
0 (M1) =
(1 )
 . I.e., by concavity, a corner
solution for psw1 implies M1 5M  (u0)
 1 [(1  ) =]. 
5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was supported by the Departments of Economics at the University of
Leicester and University of York (UK). It was presented at the 2011 RES conference
(Royal Holloway, London), the PEUK conference (Bristol), CEPET workshop (Udine),
the IFS/ESRC/Warwick Mini-Conference on the Environment and Externalities (War-
wick), and at the Universities of Exeter, Leicester, Lingnan, and York. We thank Huw
Dixon, Todd Sandler and Peter Simmons, as well as participants of the above confer-
ences and seminars for comments. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees,
an Associate Editor and the Editor, Myrna Wooders, for many helpful and insightful
comments that have greatly improved the paper. All remaining errors are ours.
6 References
ACEMOGLOU, D., and M. K. JENSEN (2010) Robust comparative statics in large
static games, IEEE Proceedings on Decision and Control 49, 3133-3139.
BAGWELL, K., and M.H. RIORDAN (1991) High and declining prices signal prod-
uct quality, American Economic Review 81, 224-239.
BARBIERI, S., and D. MALUEG (2014) Private Information in the BBV Model of
Public Goods, Journal of Public Economic Theory, forthcoming. DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12178.
BARRO, R.J., and P.M. ROMER (1987) Ski-lift pricing with applications to labour
and other markets, American Economic Review 77, 875-890.
BERGEMANN, D., and J. VÄLIMÄKI (2006) Dynamic pricing of new experience
goods, Journal of Political Economy 114, 713-743.
CORNES, R., and T. SANDLER (1996) The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods
and Club Goods. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
CRÉMER, J. (1984) On the economics of repeat buying, The RAND Journal of
Economics 15, 396-403.
COURTY, P. (2003) Ticket pricing under demand uncertainty, Journal of Law and
Economics 46, 627-52.
34
DANA, J.D. Jr. (1998) Advance-Purchase discounts and price discrimination in
competitive markets, Journal of Political Economy 106, 395-422.
FRASER, C.D. (1996) On the provision of excludable public goods, Journal of Public
Economics 60, 111-130.
FRASER, C.D. (2000) When is e¢ciency separable from distribution in the provision
of club goods? Journal of Economic Theory 90, 204-221.
FRASER, C.D. (2005) Corrigendum to When is e¢ciency separable from distribu-
tion in the provision of club goods? Journal of Economic Theory 125, 194-197.
FRASER, C.D. (2012) Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness in a club model,
Economics Letters 117, 496-499.
GAYNOR, M. (2006) What do we know about competition and quality in healthcare
markets? Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 2, 441-508.
GLAZER, A., E. NISKANEN, and S. SCOTCHMER (1997) On the use of club
theory: Preface to the club theory symposium. Journal of Public Economics 65, 3-7.
HILLMAN, A., and P. SWAN (1979) Club Participation under Uncertainty, Eco-
nomics Letters 4, 307-12.
HILLMAN, A., and P. SWAN (1983) Participation Rules for Pareto-Optimal Clubs,
Journal of Public Economics 20, 55-76.
HOERGER, T.J. (1993) Two-part pricing for experience goods in the presence of
adverse selection, International Journal of Industrial Organization 11, 451-474.
JING, B. (2011) Pricing experience goods: The e¤ects of customer recognition and
commitment, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 20, 451-473.
JUDD, K.L., and M.H. RIORDAN (1994) Price and quality in a new product
monopoly, Review of Economic Studies 61, 773-789.
KATZ, M., and C. SHAPIRO (1985) Network externalities, competition and com-
patibility, American Economic Review 75, 424-40.
KENNEDY, P. (1990) Market provision of club goods in the presence of scale economies,
Economica 57, 515-24.
KOLM, S-C. (1974) Qualitative returns to scale and the optimum nancing of envi-
ronmental policies. In: Rothenberg, J., Heggie, I.G. (Eds.), The Management of Water
Quality and the Environment. Macmillan, London, pp.151-171.
KRÄHMER, D. (2003) Entry and experimentation in oligopolistic markets for expe-
rience goods, International Journal of Industrial Organisation 21, 1201-1213.
LAMBERTINI, L., and R. ORSINI (2001) Network Externalities and the Overpro-
vision of Quality by a Monopoly, Southern Economic Journal 67, 969-82.
LEWIS, T., and D. SAPPINTON (1994) Supplying information to facilitate price
discrimination, International Economic Review 35, 309-327.
LIBESKIND, J., and R.P. RUMELT (1989) Markets for experience goods with per-
formance uncertainty, The RAND Journal of Economics 20, 601-621.
LIND, J.T. (2016) Group structure and public good provision in heterogeneous so-
cieties, Journal of Public Economic Theory doi:10.1111/jpet.12213.
LIU, T., and P. SCHIRALDI (2014) Buying Frenzies in durable-goods markets, Eu-
ropean Economic Review 70, 1-16.
35
MARLOW, L. (2000) Spending, School Structure and Public Education Quality.
Evidence from California, Economics of Education Review 19, 89-106.
MILGROM, P.R., and J. ROBERTS (1986) Price and advertising signals of product
quality. Journal of Political Economy 94, 796-821.
MILLS, D. (1981) Ownership arrangement and congestion-prone facilities, American
Economic Review 71, 493-502.
MÖLLER, M., and M. WATANABE (2010) Advance purchase discounts versus clear-
ance sales, Economic Journal 120, 1125-1148.
NOCKE, V., M. PEITZ, and F. ROSAR (2010) Advance purchase discounts as a
price discrimination device. Journal of Economic Theory 146, 141-162.
SANDLER, T., F.P. STERBENZ, and J. TSCHIRHART (1985) Uncertainty and
clubs, Economica 52, 467-477.
SANDLER, T. and J. TSCHIRHART (1997) Club theory: thirty years later, Public
Choice 93, 335-55.
SCOTCHMER, S. (1985) Two-tier pricing of shared facilities in free-entry equilib-
rium, The RAND Journal of Economics 16, 456-472.
SHESHINSKY, E. (1976) Price, quality and quantity regulation in monopoly situa-
tions, Economica 43, 127-37.
SPENCE, M. (1975) Monopoly, quality and regulation, Bell Journal of Economics
6, 417-29.
STERBENZ, F.P., and T. SANDLER (1992) Sharing among Clubs, a Club of Clubs
Theory, Oxford Economic Papers 44, 1-19.
VAN CAYSEELE, P. (1991) Consumer rationing and the possibility of intertemporal
price discrimination, European Economic Review 35, 1473-84.
VILLAS-BOAS, J. M. (2006) Dynamic competition with experience goods, Journal
of Economic Management and Strategy 15, 37-66.
WOODERS, M. (1978) Equilibrium, the core, and jurisdiction structure in economies
with a local public good, Journal of Economic Theory 18, 328-48.
WOODERS, M. (1999) Multijurisdictional economies, the Tiebout Hypothesis, and
sorting, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96, 10585-10587.
36
